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
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
SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Subversive groups in the Republic of South Africa have recently displayed a growing capability to use sabotage and terrorism to harass the white community. However, they are not likely to confront the whites with a serious challenge for several years. The recent history of these groups, although it does attest to improved conspiratorial techniques, tends to confirm their basic weaknesses when pitted against the power of the South African state.

Nonwhite Nationalism and Communism

Antigovernment activities in South Africa are distinguished from similar activities farther north by two important features: the large number of Westernized and politically active non-Europeans in South Africa, and the operations there of the oldest orthodox Communist party on the continent.

Fully a third of the 12 million nonwhites (including Asiatics and persons of mixed blood as well as Africans) are involved in the complex economic and social world of the country's urban centers. Many of the urban Africans have few ties with their tribal heritage, and as a group they are far better educated and far more sophisticated politically than Africans to the north. Until recently, nationalist ideas have come almost entirely from this relatively large group of educated nonwhites.

This situation has had two effects on nationalist activity. First, most of its leaders in

the past have been genuine moderates who realize that South Africa's economic and social complexities make interracial cooperation a prerequisite for stability. Second, the large number of people involved and the hundreds of miles separating urban areas--all of them important centers of nationalist activity--have made it nearly impossible to work out nationwide plans of action. Periodic efforts to streamline existing mass organizations have usually produced large, racially moderate groups which are excellent propaganda platforms but too amorphous for positive action in the face of the government's security activities.

Circumstances have also forced the South African Communist Party into a moderate attitude on the crucial question of racial attitudes. Founded in 1921 and operating illegally since 1950, the party has always been mainly white and Indian in membership. Since World War II the number of African members has increased, and the party has become identified with nonwhite

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nationalism, for which it has provided an organizational know-how which was unavailable from any other source. It is still mainly a non-African group, however, and thus cannot fully exploit the racial issue, potentially its most effective weapon. The Communists therefore have turned for allies to such racially moderate leaders as Albert Luthuli of the African National Congress (ANC).

Congress Alliance

Communists dominate the top echelons of the Congress Alliance, a coalition of "congresses" of the various racial groups, of which the ANC is the most important. However, the moderate racial attitude to which the Communists are tied --and perhaps their ability to understand the motivation of the African rank and file --has blinded them to most issues which might stimulate mass action. With rare exceptions the Congress Alliance's line has been devoted to high-sounding appeals to multi-racialism, and the issues on which it has chosen to make specific calls for action have been poorly selected.

In May 1961, for instance, when South Africa became a republic, the alliance decreed a general strike to protest the event. By skillfully using the alliance's organization, the African strike leader operated covertly for weeks despite frenzied police efforts



LITHULI

to find him; by adept propaganda he threw the government into a virtual state of siege. But the strike itself was a failure, not just because of the government's countermeasures, but because the issue on which it was called had no relevance for most of the nonwhites.

The failure of the May 1961 strike apparently was a turning point for the alliance. The Communists and many moderate non-Communist Africans seem to have decided that there was no chance of ever setting up an effective mass movement, and Luthuli was persuaded by Communists and sympathizers to countenance a campaign of sabotage. The first bombs--very amateurish devices--went off the following October, and two or three white Communists were caught aiding the Africans who did the actual planting. There was another outbreak of bombings in December, and

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sabotage of one kind or another has been going on fairly steadily since June 1962.

This policy shift seems to have been accompanied by much soul-searching in the Communist hierarchy. The party apparently did not circulate a statement advocating violence to its members until August 1962, and it did not publish a program incorporating the new line until the last few weeks of the year.

25X1 [redacted] the new program still painstakingly tries to avoid alienating the moderate Africans or jeopardizing the present position of non-African Communists in the nationalist movement; at the same time, it aims at exploiting the conspiratorial techniques instilled in some elements of the ANC.

"Spear of the Nation"

The group which seems to have perpetrated most of the sabotage is called "Spear of the Nation." It allegedly is the action arm of the ANC. [redacted]

In line with Luthuli's reported desires, "Spear of the Nation" has devoted itself almost entirely to sabotage of

power installations, buildings associated with the government, and the like; only one of its acts so far has endangered human life. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The movement has so far avoided any open suggestion of mass terrorism or racism, although a confidential party circular does call for greater emphasis on the ANC as the "racial organ of the African people."

The Pan-Africanists

As early as 1959 a so-called "Africanist" wing split off from the ANC and set up the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) under Robert Sobukwe. Deriving its stand from Ghanaian ideas of a unique African personality, the PAC condemned the ANC's multiracial approach; it also denounced the Communists and their ideology as un-African.

Sobukwe himself is a moderate, but his demand for recognition of Africans as a unique group brought racism closer to the surface. His appeal, translated as "Africa for the Africans," was far easier to understand than the ANC's multiracial abstractions, particularly among the mass of African workers. Even under moderate leadership the appeal of the idea was evident in March and April 1960, when PAC-inspired demonstrations led to the shootings at Sharpeville and--perhaps more spectacular--the orderly march of 30,000 Africans on the parliament buildings at Cape Town.

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SOBUKWE

The PAC was weak, however, just where the ANC was relatively strong: in organization. Sobukwe and his associates were flabbergasted by the enthusiasm at the time of Sharpeville; when they were sent to jail and their organization was banned, the PAC virtually disappeared as an entity. The Congress Alliance and the ANC, although subject to the same restrictions, did keep a bare skeleton of organization in being.

Poqo

The idea of "Africa for the Africans" dies hard; however. Remnants of the PAC managed to keep together, particularly in the large African housing areas near Cape Town. Deprived of any direction or restraint from a central authority, these ele-

ments seem to have taken a violently antiwhite line. Their movement was named Poqo, an African word meaning "pure"--an implied criticism of the ANC's multiracialism and perhaps of Sobukwe's moderation as well.

Little is known about Poqo's early history. It was heavily influenced by the criminal gangs which operate in the African areas. It probably exploited discontent with the announced government policy of gradually removing all Africans from the Cape Town region and sending them back to their "homeland" to the east. In the "homeland," Poqo apparently associated with other violence-minded groups which had grown up within the traditional society. From the first it seems to have used intimidation to enforce silence on anyone who knew about the movement, and for several months no information leaked out. As recently as February 1963, a police official confessed that his organization had not been able to find out very much about Poqo.

Even by that time, however, the situation was beginning to change. Outbreaks of rioting and assassination in late 1962 and early 1963 gave the police some insight into Poqo's organization and personnel. At about the same time, establishment of a headquarters in the nearby British-administered territory of Basutoland was proclaimed

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by Potlako Kitchener Leballo, formerly Sobukwe's second-in-command in the PAC and only recently released from jail. Leballo began [REDACTED]

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making grandiloquent statements to the press, claiming that Poqo and PAC were identical.

Partly to keep ahead of his radical followers and partly because he apparently reveled in the activity, Leballo began to agitate for an outbreak of widespread racial violence between late March and May 1963.

[REDACTED]

Late in March a wide police sweep of PAC/Poqo adherents began, and almost 3,000 have been arrested so far. Simultaneously, police in Basutoland raided Leballo's headquarters, confiscating membership lists and driving Leballo himself into hiding.

Present Situation

PAC/Poqo members reportedly are still holding meetings, and some of them may even be willing to try racial violence on their own initiative. Police are confident, however, that the organization as such has been shattered. It seems probable that Leballo has been discredited both among potential followers



LEBALLO

inside the country and among PAC leaders abroad. The government has rushed through a new battery of draconian security laws, one of whose aims is to keep Sobukwe locked up indefinitely.

Nevertheless, Leballo and Poqo demonstrated once again the effectiveness of appeals based on racism. As was the case at the time of Sharpeville, the PAC and movements associated with it lack the ability to maintain themselves for long; while their enthusiasm lasts, however, they produce far more spectacular results than does the more cautious, better disciplined "Spear of the Nation."


"Spear of the Nation," although some of its activists have been picked up recently, seems to have suffered less than PAC/Poqo from the police

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sweeps of the past few months. Its activities have been hampered more severely by the government's numerous house arrest orders, which have immobilized many known Communists and sympathizers and have driven others out of the country. Although part of its underground apparatus may have escaped police notice, the movement is likely to try to husband its resources until police vigilance has abated somewhat.


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
It seems likely that the character of nonwhite nationalist movements will undergo

considerable change in the next few years. As ANC activists learn conspiratorial techniques of their own, they may try to reduce their dependence on non-African Communists. At the same time, the PAC presumably will be acquiring the operational know-how to go with its latent capability for stirring up the mass of its followers. With the ANC edging away from multi-racialism and the PAC working out its organizational problems, the ideological and practical differences between the two groups could become blurred, and eventually both could have a violent, essentially racial solution to South Africa's problems as their acknowledged goal.

This blurring of differences might lead them into a united front, but the odds appear to be against it. In 1960 and 1961 exiles from the PAC and the Congress Alliance were joined in such a front, but mutual distrust forced its break-up.



The South African police are aware of these fears and can be expected to encourage them. It seems likely, therefore, that the ANC and PAC will use up much of their meager potential in struggles with each other.



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